Cybersecurity company Huntress has identified a worm-like malware campaign targeting ConnectWise ScreenConnect environments, affecting at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations as of Nov. 11.
The investigation has linked the activity to an authentication flaw in the third-party RMM+ extension, which could allow attackers to execute commands without standard ScreenConnect authentication under certain configurations. ConnectWise has disabled several related extensions across its hosted environments as MSPs assess their exposure.
The campaign highlights the security risks associated with third-party remote management integrations, particularly when compromised tools can provide access to multiple customer endpoints.
ScreenConnect malware spreads across 288 endpoints
The attack in question involves threat actors using compromised ScreenConnect panels to execute commands across groups of managed endpoints, installing unauthorized ScreenConnect clients and a malicious toolkit known as SCKit.
This toolkit is designed to establish persistent remote access across connected systems and intercept technician session cookies.
When Huntress began observing the activity on November 11, all 288 identified endpoints were affected within 90 minutes, with approximately one-third compromised during the first 10 minutes.
Huntress’ investigation found that attackers used ScreenConnect’s Run Command functionality to deploy malicious files and install attacker-controlled ScreenConnect clients. The SCKit toolkit consists of 16 files, including PowerShell scripts, batch files, and Windows command-line utilities designed to facilitate lateral movement and maintain access to compromised systems.
The toolkit also contains functionality designed to steal ScreenConnect session cookies from technicians’ workstations and use those credentials to access additional sessions.
However, Huntress notes that it has not observed successful attempts to spread from infected endpoints to technician workstations or from those workstations to additional endpoints. Recovered host logs reviewed by Huntress showed that console-takeover attempts had failed.
RMM+ authentication flaw linked to attack activity
An update to the investigation found that the activity appears to be connected to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension that allows other tools to manage ScreenConnect sessions without requiring technicians to work through the console.
Version 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 of RMM+ contained an authentication flaw that allowed requests to be authenticated with a blank access key if an administrator had not configured one. The extension bypasses ScreenConnect user accounts, roles, and multifactor authentication, relying instead on a shared access key stored in its settings.
Huntress’ observations matched this vulnerability: commands reached endpoints across multiple ScreenConnect instances within minutes, with no corresponding login activity in the reviewed logs.
ConnectWise had previously identified five independent third-party extensions that could be associated with the activity and, as a precaution, disabled them across more than 400 partner environments. The extensions included Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link.
ConnectWise has since disabled RMM+ and several related plugins across its hosted environments and urged on-premises partners to do the same.
What MSPs should do to secure ScreenConnect environments
Huntress is advising organizations using ScreenConnect to review their environments, even if they have not received an alert.
Recommended steps include examining Run Command and Shared Toolbox histories for unauthorized activity and checking managed endpoints for additional, unrecognized ScreenConnect clients.
Organizations that suspect an endpoint has been compromised should avoid connecting to it through ScreenConnect. Huntress warns that an interactive session could trigger the malware’s designed propagation mechanisms, potentially exposing a technician’s workstation. Instead, defenders should use EDR live response, WinRM, or another out-of-band command-line tool.
Additional recommendations include:
- Isolating affected endpoints until cleanup is complete.
- Removing unauthorized ScreenConnect clients and associated persistence mechanisms.
- Reviewing ScreenConnect panel activity to identify potentially exposed systems and technician workstations.
- Terminating active ScreenConnect web sessions.
- Rotating affected credentials from a clean device.
- Revoke potentially exposed browser and identity-provider sessions because the toolkit can steal browser session tokens.
Huntress is continuing to track and respond to the incident and has published technical details and indicators of compromise to help defenders identify and investigate the activity.


